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SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN MISSOURI-
SOME DISTURBING ABERRATIONS
JOHN S. DIVILBISS*
Summary judgments did not come to Missouri until 1960-ong after
their introduction in many other states. When the summary judgment
procedure was proposed in 1943 it met with sufficient opposition to cause
its rejection.' Much of the early opposition was due to a misunderstanding
of the rule, and some of this misunderstanding lingers on.
The summary judgment motion is intended to fill an important need
jn modern procedure. Missouri lawyers are keenly aware that prior to
1960 a capricious claim or defense could be disposed of only after the
delay and expense of a full scale trial. A demurrer or motion for judgment
on the pleadings could be granted only when the stalling lawyer was so
unimaginative as to omit an essential element from his claim or failed
to plead a legal defense. The courts could not "go behind" those pleadings
and avoid a trial, no matter how fanciful the pleaded allegations. Mis-
souri courts, unlike the federal courts, impose no sanctions on lawyers
who file purely capricious pleadings.&2 The lawyer who formerly filed the
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. Mr. Charles Carr wrote that the summary judgment section was omitted
from the new 1943 Missouri Civil Code "apparently on the ground, and based on
federal precedents, that said sections did not contain adequate safeguards against
rendering summary judgments on conflicting affidavits and against improper in-
vasion of the jury province." See 1 CARR, MISSOURI CiI. PROCEDUME 15 (1947).
Professor Atkinson, Technical Advisor to the Missouri Supreme Court Committee
on Civil Procedure during the formulation of the 1943 Code, wrote:
The elimination of this [the summary judgment] procedure from the
code may have been based upon distrust of trial courts. True, a judge
might grant a summary judgment in an improper case, but he can also
direct a verdict in an improper case. The remedy in both situations is the
same--by appeal. Perhaps, after all, the objection to the procedure was
really based upon the professional antipathy to anything which results
in expedition. It may be remarked in this connection that most of the
English reforms such as summary judgments originated through the
efforts of laymen to inject a common sense attitude into court procedure.
American lawyers also may well harken to criticisms of laymen as to the
expense and delays caused by traditional legal procedure.
See Atkinson, Missouri's New Civil Procedure: A Critique of the Process of
Procedural Improvement, 9 Mo. L. REV. 47, 63 (1944).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides in part: "The signature of an attorney con-
stitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay."
(29)
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"nuisance value" petition or the "stalling tactic" answer could plead what
he knew was false, force his opponent to suffer the delay and expense of
trial, and further clutter the congested dockets without penalty.
The summary judgment ruie requires that issues be "genuine" and
not merely pleaded. It is important to remember that summary judgment
hearings do not resolve these "genuine" issues but merely determine
whether such issues in fact exist. If they exist, the case is set for trial. If
they do not exist, no one has need of a trial.
3
The Missouri rule is almost a duplicate of the federal rule. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court has said: "Civil Rule 74.04, V.A.M.R., relating to
summary judgment procedures, is practically identical with Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... The federal rule had been in existence
for many years when the Missouri rule was adopted in 1960. Thus the
federal decisions construing Rule 56 are particularly persuasive in applying
the Missouri rule."14 Two rather recent Missouri cases suggest an ap-
proach to summary judgments which, either intentionally or accidentally,
varies radically from the federal cases and seriously threatens the useful-
ness of Missouri's summary judgment rule. In order for these Missouri
cases to be examined closely, some review of the federal decisions on sum-
mary judgments is required.
I. THE DIRECTED VEPDICT TEST
Missouri Rule 74.04(c) provides that summary judgment shall be
rendered if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."
The same principle which permits a trial judge to grant a directed
verdict authorizes him to grant a summary judgment, and the test applied
by the judge is the same.5 The United States Supreme Court has said that
"a summary disposition ... should be on evidence which a jury would not
be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for
the moving party."8 Thus when five claimants attempted to recover on an
oral contract to make a will the court said:
It would seem, therefore, that considering the allegations of the
complaint, and those of the answers to interrogatories in the light
3. See 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.04[1] at 2060 (2d ed. 1965).
4. Cooper v. Finke, 376 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. 1964).
5. See 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrIcE 56.04[2J at 2066 (2d ed. 1965).
6. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 624 (1944).
[Vol. 32
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most favorable to the claimants, there would be lacking at the
trial that precise, convincing, and persuasive proof of the oral
contract alleged that would require the court to submit the issue
of its making to the jury and we perceive no difference of princi-
ple in respect to the quantum of evidence required which distin-
guishes the entry of summary judgment from the direction of a
verdict in favor of the defendant.7
A. Evidence Which Justifies Granting a Summary Judgment
for the Defendant
As explained above, a summary judgment is appropriate on the same
evidence which would justify a directed verdict. The comparison requires
a further explanation because a directed verdict motion comes after a por-
tion of the trial has been completed, while the summary judgment motion
comes before the trial starts. The kind of evidence before the judge is
obviously different. In the former case the judge has "live" testimony,
while in the latter he has only affidavits, admissions, depositions, and in-
terrogatories. A summary judgment motion should be granted if the same
admissions, affidavits, etc., accompanying the motion are such that if
presented as "live" testimony at a trial, and if this were all the testimony
given, a directed verdict would be granted.8
Thus when plaintiff made conclusive admissions which were not ex-
plained, the court granted a summary judgment to defendant saying:
[T]he ruling is to be made on the record the parties have actually
presented, not on one potentially possible. Hence the case here is
as though defendant had offered plaintiff's admissions, and plain-
tiff had then rested, with no contradiction or rebuttal of any kind,
7. Appolonio v. Baxter, 217 F.2d 267, 271 (6th Cir. 1954).
8. In Fishman v. Teter, 133 F.2d 222, 223 (7th Cir. 1943) the court said:
"In other words, it was for the court to determine, if the evidence contained in
the affidavits was orally submitted to the court, whether the evidence justified
submitting the case to the jury."
In Braughton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Mo. 1960)
plaintiff sued TWA and United for the death of his wife and two children in the
Grand Canyon disaster. Plaintiff's family was riding on a TWA pass which re-
lieved TWA of liability except for gross and wanton negligence. The trial judge
granted TWA's motion for summary judgment. Lengthy pre-trial conferences had
been held and the trial judge said:
Suffice to say, that from the evidence adduced and facts established
of record in the aforementioned [pre-trial] transcripts as to which there
can be no dispute between the parties ... it is transparent that, assuming
all facts to be true which plaintiff here states he will rely on at the trial
of this case to establish gross and wanton negligence . . . this Court would
be required to direct a verdict in favor of TWA .... Id. at 139.
1967]
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and had made its own motion for a directed verdict or peremptory
instruction.0
The courts are unwilling to deny a summary judgment simply be-
cause the opposing party claims a better case is "potentially possible" by
the time the trial rolls around. A defendant who moves for summary
judgment ought not be subjected to the expense and burden of a full scale
trial if plaintiff is unwilling or unable to offer sworn testimony which
would, if offered at trial, make a submissible case.10 If plaintiff has no
such case, he has no business forcing defendant to trial.
This principle is illustrated in Orvis v. Brickma. 11 Plaintiff suffered
a self-inflicted cut on her wrist which was thought to be a suicide attempt
by the police officer called to the scene. Plaintiff was taken to a hospital
early in the morning, but the court order requiring her to be held did not
reach the hospital until late the same afternoon. Plaintiff filed suit for false
imprisonment naming, among others, two doctors in the hospital. Each of
the doctors filed a motion for a summary judgment accompanied by an
affidavit that he did not know of plaintiff's presence in the hospital until
after the hospital had received the court order. The trial judge granted
a summary judgment because "plaintiff failed to assert any fact contra-
dictory to the affidavits of the doctors." The court said:
Knowledge on the part of [defendants] . . . of plaintiff's
presence at the hospital prior to receipt of the court order com-
mitting her, is an essential element of plaintiff's case against
them....
All the plaintiff has in this case is the hope that on cross-
examination . . . the defendants . . . will contradict their respec-
9. Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399,
405 (2d Cir. 1945). (Emphasis added.)
10. See JAMEs, CrvIL PROCEDURE § 6.18, at 236 (1965):
Where there is something which points to a specific likelihood that trial
will elicit evidence not otherwise available, denial of a summary judg-
ment might be warranted. But where trial is required, "only on the vague
hope or suspicion that somehow some evidence may thereby be developed,
the advantages of speed and early disclosure afforded by the summaryjudgment procedure are largely dissipated without a commensurate re-
turn of justice to the litigants."
11. 95 F. Supp. 605 (D.D.C. 1951). The case was affirmed on appeal in 196
F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952). The court on appeal held that the hospital was re-
quired to detain plaintiff until the police had time to get a court order requiring
etention of plaintiff. Thus as a matter of law, defendants doctors were not liable.
The court makes it clear that summary judgment was appropriate in any event
as plaintiff failed to produce evidence at the summary judgment hearing that de-
fendants doctors had notice. The uncontradicted affidavits of defendants showed
there was no genuine issue.
[Vol., 32
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tive affidavits. This is purely speculative, and to permit trial on
such basis would nullify the purpose of Rule 56....
On a record such as was before the court at the time of the
hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment-in fact as
the record now stands-a motion for directed verdict would have
to be granted.' 2
B. Evidence Which Justifies Granting a Summary
Judgment for thte Plaintiff
Plaintiffs receive fewer directed verdicts than defendants and, like-
wise, receive fewer summary judgments.13 But there are occasions when
the absence of genuine issues would make it unfair to force a plaintiff to
suffer the expense of a full scale trial.
The obvious and immediate problem faced by the plaintiff who wants
either a directed verdict or a summary judgment is the credibility question,
more accurately called the risk of non-persuasion. Even if defendant offers
no testimony at a trial, plaintiff may lose his case because of his inability
to persuade the jury of the truth of his contentions. 14 In the same way,
12. 95 F. Supp. 605, 606-07 (D.D.C. 1951).
13. Since 1960 two summary judgments have been granted to plaintiffs and
affirmed on appeal.
In Brummett v. Livingston, 384 S.W.2d 101 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964) a real
estate broker collected his commission when defendant's interrogatory answers ad-
mitted that plaintiff produced a purchaser. In Lynch v. Webb City School Dist.
No. 92, 373 S.W.2d 193 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963) plaintiff, a schoolteacher, was fired
while her contract was in force. The school board minutes showed on their face
that plaintiff was fired without proper cause and she was ordered reinstated with
back pay.
A third case which might be included in this category is State ex rel. Reardon
v. Mueller, 388 S.W.2d 53 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965). The State brought an action
challenging the right of Alderman Mueller to hold office because he was not a
resident of the ward from which elected. Summary judgment was granted against
Mueller based on the statements he made in his pleading and in his deposition.
14. In Holtzman v. Holtzman, 278 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955), the
court said:
The trial court had no power premptorily to direct a verdict in favor of
the parties having the burden of proof, Staehlin v. Major, Mo. App., 199
S.W. 427, because defendant was entitled to have the jury pass upon the
credibility of plaintiffs' witnesses. The jury had a right to reject and
find against plaintiffs' testimony. Troll v. Protected Home Circle, 161
Mo. App. 719, 141 S.W. 916. When the trial court directed a verdict for
plaintiffs it in effect told the jury that it must believe the witnesses for
plaintiffs and disbelieve the defendant. This it had no right to do. Gan-
non v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 145 Mo. 502, 46 S.W. 968, 47 S.W. 907;
Wolff v. Campbell, 110 Mo. 114, 19 S.W. 622; Cluck v. Abe, 328 Mo. 81,
40 S.W.2d 558. This constituted an invasion of the province of the jury
and a denial to defendant of the right of trial by jury. Staehlin v. Major,
supra. It would have been error for the court to direct a verdict for plain-
tiffs (the parties having the burden of proof) even though defendant had
19671
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failure of a defendant to offer counter-affidavits would not entitle plaintiff
to a summary judgment if the credibility of plaintiff's witnesses remained
an issue.
Directed verdicts and summary judgments for plaintiffs may be given
only where such a credibility problem does not exist.1" This most commonly
occurs when defendant by his own testimony makes admissions which estab-
lish the necessary elements of plaintiff's case. American Airlines, Inc. v.
Ulen'G is a classic example. Plaintiff was injured when the plane in which
she was riding struck a mountain. She charged negligence, which the air-
line denied, so there was a pleaded issue. Defendant by its interrogatory
answers admitted that the plane was flying at an altitude below that per-
mitted by Civil Air Regulations when the crash occurred. Plaintiff moved
for a summary judgment and attached the interrogatory answers. The
court held that the airline's admission that it struck the mountain while
violating the minimum altitude regulation conclusively established negli-
gence so that negligence was not a genuine issue. A summary judgment was
introduced no evidence whatever. This is the rule in all cases except
where the defendant has admitted the plaintiff's cause of action or by
his evidence has established plaintiff's claim.
The rule is expressed in 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE 56.02 [10] at 2044 (2d
ed. 1965) as follows:
Further, since credibility is normally a matter for the trier of the facts
to pass on at a live trial, it is not the trial court's function to pass upon
credibility in evaluating the evidentiary material in support of and in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, where the issue of credi-
bility would properly be for the jury if the case were so tried.
15. The principle has recently been expressed as follows:
Was plaintiff entitled to a directed verdict on its petition? The law govern-
ing the direction of a verdict for the party carrying the burden of proof
is well-articulated in this oft-quoted statement from Coleman v. Jackson
County, 349 Mo. 255, 261, 160 S.W.2d 691, 693(2): "It is a generally
accepted rule in this state that a verdict may not be directed in favor of
the proponent, that is the party upon whom the law casts the final burden
of proof. (Citing cases) There is, however, a well-recognized exception to
the rule. If the opponent, that is the party not having the burden of
proof, admits either in his pleadings or by counsel in open court or in
his individual testimony on the trial the truth of the basic facts upon
which the claim of the proponent rests, a verdict may be directed against
him, and if the proof is altogether of a documentary nature and the au-
thenticity and correctness of the documents are unquestioned, and if
such proof establishes beyond all doubt that truth of facts which as a
matter of law entitled the proponent to the relief sought, and such proof is
unimpeached and uncontradicted, the proponent will be entitled to a
peremptory instruction. This is upon the theory that there is no question
of fact left in the case and that upon the questions of law involved the
jury has no right to pass. (Citing cases)" (All emphasis herein is ours.)
M.F.A. Central Cooperative v. Harrill, 405 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1966).
16. 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 32
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granted on the issue of liability, and the jury decided only the measure of
damages.
II. RECENT MISSOURI ABERRATIONS
A. Pleaded Issues
Missouri Rule 74.04(c) provides that a summary judgment shall be
granted when the moving party shows "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact." Genuine issues are to be sharply distinguished from pleaded
issues. Subsection (e) of the same rule states:
[W]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
The committee note following Rule 74.04 says:
If pleading allegations are sufficient to raise a genuine issue as
against uncontradicted evidentiary matter, this remedy then be-
comes substantially without utility ...
[Slubdivision (e) . . . makes it clear that pleading allega-
tions cannot, in themselves, create a genuine issue of material
fact when summary judgment is sought.
The words could hardly be clearer, but these words on occasion have been
overlooked or misread.
A 1966 St. Louis Court of Appeals decision severely impairs the value
of the summary judgment rule. In Burms v. Weber,17 defendant was co-
maker of a note. Payment was not made as required and plaintiff sued
defendant for the balance due. Defendant first filed a general denial, but
by failing to properly answer certain requests for admissions, defendant
admitted that the note was genuine and that payment had not been made.
Plaintiff then moved for a summary judgment and attached an affi-
davit alleging that defendant executed and delivered a note to plaintiff
and that, after certain payments of principal and interest were deducted,
a balance of $3,200.00 was due and unpaid. Defendant by an amended
answer admitted that she signed the note and admitted the prior pay-
ments, but asserted the affirmative defense of lack of consideration and
the further "defense" that it was "agreed between the parties" that she
would not be liable on the note.
17. 399 S.W.2d 446 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
1967]
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Defendant at no time filed any counter-affidavits, but relied exclusive-
ly on her pleaded affirmative defenses. On this record the trial judge granted
summary judgment against defendant for $3,200.00 plus interest. De-
fendant appealed and the St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed. The court
said:
The vital issue presented by defendant's second assignment
is whether, under the pleadings, the admissions, and the plain-
tiff's affidavit, there remain any genuine issue as to a material
fact. If so, then it was error to render the judgment in favor of
plaintiff .... Is
The court summarized the record, saying:
Essentially, therefore, the situation is one in which plaintiff mere-
ly declared on the note, negotiable in form, and attached it to his
petition; and defendant, while admitting that she had executed
the note, affirmatively pleaded the defense of want of considera-
tion.19
The court then reached the peculiar conclusion that "defendant's
pleaded defense of absence of consideration raised a genuine issue as to a
material fact and that under the present state of the record, plaintiff was
not entitled to a summary judgment. '20 (The additional defense of a paroi
agreement that plaintiff would not be liable on the note was held to be
legally insufficient and, of itself, would not have precluded entry of a sum-
mary judgment.)
Unless overruled, this decision is apt to haunt Missouri lawyers for a
long time. The Committee Note following Missouri Rule 74.04 says:
If pleading allegations are sufficient to raise a genuine issue as
against uncontradicted evidentiary matter, this [the summary
judgment] remedy then becomes substantially without utility....
Rule 74.04(e) states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon, the
mnere allegations or denials of his pleading .... (Emphasis added.)
Defendant did not respond, but relied completely on a pleaded affirma-
18. Id. at 448.
19. Id. at 449. (Emphasis added.)
20. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 32
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tive defense.21 She admitted the note and the non-payment. She offered no
"opposing affidavits . ..made on personal knowledge . .. [setting] forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence . . ." as required by 74.04(e).
If the case had been tried with defendant admitting the note and the non-
payment and offering no proof to support her affirmative defense, plaintiff
would have received a directed verdict.22 Defendant's admissions obviously
removed the credibility problem. Summary judgment was properly granted
and should have been affirmed on appeaL23
B. Adequacy of Counter-Affldavits
A second case which will likely impair the effectiveness of the sum-
mary judgment rule is Cooper v. Fnke,24 decided by the Missouri Supreme
Court in 1964. Plantiff, a fourteen year old boy, was injured when a display
tombstone fell on him as he was "rocking" it. The tombstone was located
in an unfenced area adjacent to defendant's monument business. The
plaintiff sued on an attractive nuisance theory and alleged that the stones
were on temporary stands, were unsteady, and were "easily rocked"; that
for several years prior to his injury children were attracted to the display
yard and played on the stones by "rocking" them. Defendant's answer
denied plaintiff's petition and alleged contributory negligence.
Plaintiff's deposition disclosed that plaintiff and his younger brother
ate dinner at a restaurant across the street from defendant's monument
business; that while they waited for other members of the family to finish
eating, plaintiff and his brother went to defendant's display yard; that it
was about 8:30 p.m., dark, and defendant's business was closed. Plaintiff
and his brother began playing around the monuments; plaintiff rocked a
21. Compare Port of Palm Beach Dist. v. Goethals, 104 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.
1939). Here plaintiff sued on a certificate of indebtedness. Defendant admitted
that the document was genuine, but pleaded, among other defenses, fraud and the
statute of limitations. The court granted summary judgment to plaintiff because
no affidavits were produced to sustain these defenses. Plaintiff's affidavits plus
defendant's admissions made out a prima facie case, which if uncontradicted at
trial would have required a directed verdict.
22. Supra note 15.
23. See JAMEs, CIvIL PROCEDURE, § 6.18, at 230 (1965):
A natural question is why anyone should want to plead groundlessly
when he should know that he will not be able to make his pleading good
when proof is called for. Unfortunately there are reasons. A defendant
from whom payment is sought (e.g., for services rendered or goods sold
and delivered) often wants delay. Indeed, that may well be the very
reason why suit had to be brought. And defendant can have delay by the
simple device of denying the debt, and perhaps gilding the lily by adding
pleas of payment and breach of warranty-a trilogy know in the trade
as the last refuge of the deadbeat.
24. 376 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1964).
1967]
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monument back and forth until it fell on him. Defendant in his deposition
testified that he had never seen children playing among the monuments
and had never had any reports of children so playing. In substance he
denied under oath the actual or constructive knowledge which plaintiff
must prove to make a submissible case.
25
Defendant moved for a summary judgment on the basis of all the
depositions and two exhibits. 26 The depositions of plaintiff and the mem-
bers of his family were not "on file" at the time of the motion, and the
supreme court said they could not be considered. No such construction
has ever been given the identical language in the federal rule,27 but it
25. The Missouri Supreme Court in Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1234,
130 S.W.2d 623, 627 (1939) adopts the Restatement view that plaintiff must
show that "the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass .... "
Instruction Number 22.01 of the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions directs a
verdict for plaintiff in an attractive nuisance case only if the jury believes that
"defendant knew or should have known that [condition] was attractive to chil-
dren and that children so attracted would be exposed to an unreasonable risk of
serious harm from [the condition] .... .
26. The opinion mentions the exhibits but does not indicate what they
showed.
27. Missouri Rule 74.04(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis
supplied.)
The supreme court held that the words "on file" apply not only to "admis-
sions" but also to depositions, and that depositions not on file may not be con-
sidered. This construction has never been given to identical language in the
federal rule. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRaTicricE 56.11[1.-5] at 2146 (2d ed. 1965) says:
Rule 56(c) includes "admissions on file" within its enumeration of
materials that may be used in support of or in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment. While Rule 36 [relating to requests for admis-
sions] provides a very useful procedure to obtain admissions, Rule 56(c)
does not limit the use of admissions to those so obtained; and hence any
material that is on file that may properly be treated as an admission of a
party may be considered on a motion for summary judgment.
In Jno. T. McCoy, Inc. v. Schuster, 44 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) the
judge ruled on a summary judgment motion and considered a deposition not
properly certified as "no motion has been made to suppress the deposition."
The construction given the clause by the Missouri Supreme Court is also
contrary to traditional grammatical meaning. The words "on file" are close or
restrictive modifiers attached to the headword "admissions" and modify only that
headword. See PERRIN, WRrTER's GUIDE AND INDEX TO ENGLISH (4th ed. 1960).
It is hard to imagine why an appellate court would ever ignore depositions to
which no objection has been raised simply because of a failure to follow Missouri
Rule 57.42. This rule requires only that depositions be "sealed up . . . [and] de-
livered . . . to the recorder of the county in which the suit is pending." Missouri
Rule 57.48(d) specifically provides:
Errors and irregularities in the manner in which ... the deposition is
prepared, signed, certified, sealed, indorsed, transmitted, filed, or other-
wise dealt with by the officer under Rule 57 are waived unless a motion
to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with reasonable
10
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made little difference as plaintiff's petition showed he was a trespasser and
was injured when he deliberately "rocked" a tombstone until it fell on him.
Defendant argued that plaintiff was a trespasser and guilty of contributory
negligence.
The trial judge granted defendant's motion for summary judgment,
but the supreme court reversed holding that the record did not show that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The
issue of plaintiff's trespass was not mentioned in the decision.
Defendant based his motion on the admissions in the petition and
the sworn testimony in both his own and plaintiff's depositions. The only
document filed by plaintiff in opposition was an affidavit made by one of
plaintiff's attorneys. The supreme court said that plaintiff's attorney "as-
serted facts substantially as alleged in plaintiff's petition." Indeed he did.
The affidavit is not set out in the opinion, but the court file shows that it
was nothing more than another petition prefaced with a claim of personal
knowledge and followed by an acknowledgment. It even repeated the
prayer for damages. 28
Rule 74.04(e) specifically requires that "supporting and opposing affi-
davits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
afflant is competent to testify .... " (Emphasis added.) The attorney could
not make an affidavit on what he learned from others for this would be
hearsay. Hearsay testimony and opinion testimony that would not be ad-
missible at trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit.29
Anything is possible, so plaintiff's attorney may have witnessed the
fall and had such personal knowledge of the facts that he could have
promptness after such defect is, or with due diligence might have been,
ascertained.
There is no suggestion that plaintiff protested the use of these depositions on the
summary judgment motion. Had such an objection been raised, it could have
been cured in about thirty seconds. Such a trifling and unprotested irregularity, if
it was an irregularity, should not be allowed to affect the outcome of a case on
appeal.
28. In addition to copying the petition and alleging personal knowledge of
the facts, the affidavit recited a history of the pleadings and motions up to the
time of the summary judgment motion and alleged that the affidavit showed
genuine issues which prevented a summary judgment.
29. "Hearsay testimony and opinion testimony that would not be admissible
if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit." 6 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRAcrICE, 56.2211] at 2806 (2d ed. 1965).
In Seward v. Nissen, 2 F.R.D. 545 (D. Del. 1942) the court said: "The affi-
davit of plaintiff's attorney is clearly hearsay.... In connection with motions for




Divilbiss: Divilbiss: Summary Judgements in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
climbed into the witness box and made out plaintiff's case all by himself.
Plaintiff's attorney swore personal knowledge of the following:
1. "That the bottom surfaces of the tombstones, monuments and
grave markers ... were irregular and unsmooth .... "
(Busy lawyers can appreciate the work involved in checking the bottom
of all those grave markers.)
2. "That for several years prior to [the date of the accident] the
above described condition regarding the tombstones, monu-
ments and grave markers continued to exist ....
(The bottoms of the tombstones were not only checked after the accident,
but they had been checked periodically prior thereto so that the attorney
can now testify that the condition existed for "several years prior to the
[accident].")
3. "That for several years prior to [the date of the accident] ...
children entered the yard displaying the aforesaid tombstones
.. . and rocked, swayed and tilted the aforesaid tombstones."
(The attorney-affiant was perhaps a steady customer at defendant's monu-
ment works and noticed the children during his visits.)
4. "That on the 24th day of April, 1962, the plaintiff entered the
above described display yard of the defendant and began to
rock a tall, heavy monument back and forth and after the
monument began to rock it fell over upon the plaintiff . .. ."
(One wonders if the attorney-affiant rushed to give first aid, for if he had
personal knowledge of the accident, he was there.)
It would be unfair to say that the attorney did not have personal
knowledge of all these facts, but if he did, it is the most remarkable set of
coincidences since Adam, Eve, and the snake all showed up under the
same apple tree. Indeed, one wonders if the attorney should be represent-
ing plaintiff when he is such a valuable witness, not only to the accident
but also to the long standing nuisance maintained by defendant.
It is possible that the attorney-affiant did not understand what Rule
74.04(e) means by "personal knowledge." The supreme court not only
missed a good opportunity to explain it, but also gave its tacit blessing to
defendant's most bizarre interpretation of the term.
The supreme court ruled that defendant must face the expense of a
full scale trial. Except for the attorney's affidavit-which should have been
[Vol. 32
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ignored as patently without value3 0-no one came forward to state under
oath those matters on which testimony would be required to make a sub-
missible case. If no such person exists, defendant should not be burdened
with the expense of trial. If such person is available, there is no excuse for
plaintiff's failure to produce an appropriate affidavit at the summary judg-
ment hearing.
The court refers to the "pleaded" charge that "children for several years
prior to the happening were attracted to the monument display and rocked,
swayed and tilted them-all with defendant's knowledge."31 The court
then said, "[W]hether this can be supported by substantial proof is another
question."3 2 This ought not be a question. Why should defendant be sub-
jected to the expense of trial when it is not clear that plaintiff can do
more than plead a good case? Defendant denied under oath that he had
ever seen or even heard of children playing on his display lot. Plaintiff
cannot make a submissible case unless he proves that defendant knew
or should have known that the tombstones were attractive to children 3
If there is to be a genuine issue on the question of actual or constructive
knowledge, plaintiff must produce an affidavit by someone with personal
knowledge who will swear to facts showing that defendant had actual or
constructive knowledge that the tombstones attracted children.
4
The rule is expressed by Moore as follows:
But if the moving party by affidavit or otherwise presents
materials which would require a directed verdict in his favor, if
presented at trial, then he is entitled to summary judgment un-
less the opposing party either shows that affidavits are then un-
30. In Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 248 F.2d 57, 59 (5th
Cir. 1957) the court said:
There were no affidavits on file, except that the attorneys for the rival
claimants appended their own affidavits to some of the pleadings. In no
instance did such affidavits show that the facts were based upon the
affiants' knowledge; or that they otherwise complied with the require-
ments of Rule 56(e) F.R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C.A. In fact, it is obvious that
the attorneys did not have any personal knowledge of the facts and that
they were not competent to testify to them. Such affidavits have no pro-
bative value on a motion for summary judgment.
31. Cooper v. Finke, supra note 24, at 230.
32. Ibid.
33. Hull v. Gillioz, supra note 25.
34. See Gifford v. Travelers Protective Ass'n, 153 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir.
1946):
Where a defendant presents evidence on which it would be entitled to a
directed verdict if believed and which the plaintiff does not discredit as
dishonest, it rests on the plaintiff, in opposing defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, at least to specify some opposing evidence which it can
adduce and which will change the result.
19671
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available to him, or he comes forward with some materials, by
affidavit or otherwise, that show there is a triable issue of material
fact.31
If, at trial, the only evidence on defendant's actual or constructive know-
ledge were defendant's denial, defendant would receive a directed verdict.
He should also have received a summary judgment where his affidavit was
unchallenged by sworn testimony from anyone with personal knowledge.
Summary judgment motions will serve little purpose if they can be
defeated each time plaintiff's lawyer files a warmed-over petition and calls
it an affidavit based on personal knowledge.
C, Confusing the Summary Judgment Motion with the Motion
To Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
A third Missouri case casts a shadow of confusion by applying the
summary judgment label to what should have been called a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. It is not a serious interference with the
summary judgment procedure, but any confusion of remedies should be
avoided.
In Dowdy v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,30 plaintiff was the wife and
beneficiary of an insured who had a group life policy with Lincoln Life. In-
sured was a union member and the union administered the group policy
through three trustees who apparently issued individual insurance certifi-
cates under the group policy. Insured died, payment on the policy was re-
fused, and plaintiff sued both Lincoln Life and the trustees. The policy
was made a part of the petition.
Insured had been laid off in July, 1962, and died the following Septem-
ber. The policy provided that insurance coverage was terminated if insured
ceased to be a full time employee unless the trustees continued to pay the
premiums. In such a case insured would be treated as an employee on
temporary layoff and the policy would remain in force. The policy also gave
insured a conversion privilege for thirty days after his employment was
terminated so that the insurance could be continued-apparently on a
regular life basis.
Plaintiff sued the trustees on two theories. First, she claimed they were
liable as insurers, that all conditiorns of the policy had been met, and that
no payment had been made. Second, plaintiff claimed the trustees failed
35. 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACricE 56.11[3J at 2171 (2d ed. 1965).
36. 384 S.W.2d 282 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
[Vol. 32
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss1/8
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN MISSOURI
to inform insured of their decision not to continue premium payments
during insured's layoff; that as a result insured did not convert his policy
to regular life insurance; and that the trustees thereby breached their duty
to insured and plaintiff.
The trial judge granted trustees' motion for a "summary judgment."
The trustees filed no affidavits, depositions, or supporting papers with their
motion, but they relied exclusively on plaintiff's petition and the attached
policy. The appellate court affirmed the trial judge pointing out that the
insurance policy imposed no duty on the trustees to continue the policy in
force during layoffs or to inform insured of their decision. The trial and
appellate courts both neglected to note the distinction between a motion of
summary judgment and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The functions of the two rules are entirely different. Moore states:
If the motion [for summary judgment] is made by the defendant
solely on the basis of the complaint the motion is functionally
equivalent to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6); the complaint should be liberally construed in
favor of the complainant; the facts alleged in the complaint must
be taken as true; and the motion for summary judgment must be
denied if a claim has been pleaded.3 7
The plaintiff pleaded both a duty by trustees to continue the insurance
premiums during layoff or to advise the insured of the decision to do
otherwise and a breach of this duty. There is no suggestion that plaintiff
claimed the duty was spelled out in the policy. The trustees might have
assumed this obligation by an agreement totally independent of the insur-
ance policy and plaintiff's petition was broad enough to allow such proof.
Admittedly the same result might have been reached if defendant had
filed a summary judgment motion with supporting affidavits, but failure to
note the distinction between summary judgment motions and motions for
failure to state a claim will cause some confusion. The difference is not an
academic one. If plaintiff's petition is defective, leave to amend would
normally be granted.38 In contrast, a summary judgment is a disposition
of the case on the merits.&3 9 The sufficiency of the petition does not de-
termine whether summary judgment should be granted for "if this were
37. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.11[2] at 2152 (2d ed. 1965). (Emphasis
added.)
38. Missouri Rule 55.53 provides that a party may amend after a responsive
pleading has been filed with leave of court, "and leave shall be freely given where
justice so requires."
39. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.03, at 2051 (2d ed. 1965).
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not the case, [the rule relating to summary judgments] would be a nullity
for it would merely duplicate the motion to dismiss." 40
Missouri's summary judgment rule is less than six years old and some
growing pains should be expected. But congested court dockets cry for re-
lief, and summary judgments can help ease the congestion if permitted
to function in Missouri as they have functioned in the federal courts.
40. Lindsey v. Leavy, 149 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1945).
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